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Abstract: In January 2004 eleven members of the European Union (EU) took a new step 
toward the creation of a single European market. They launched the European Monetary Union 
and implemented a new cross-border currency, the euro.This event was unprecedented in 
monetary history. This article deals with the macro-economic effects of euro implementation. 
First, it considers the trade-creating and trade-destroying effects within the new currency area as 
well as for non-EMU countries. It then examines the internal economic implications for 
countries both within and outside of the new euro-currency zone 
 
Trade-Creating Effects 
Perhaps the strongest economic  argument touted for implementing the single 
currency is the reduction (or elimination) of currency-conversion transaction costs as 
traders move from one euroland country to another with goods and services for sale. 
Americans have long enjoyed the advantage of a single currency with its attendant 
lower transaction costs as residents trade across state borders. Clearly, as transaction 
costs fall, trade expands and wealth is created. For non-euroland members of the EU, 
this benefit can be captured to the extent that their nationals (firms, banks, and 
individuals) decide to carry out their transactions in euros, rather than in their national 
currencies. Many non-euroland companies have already moved to adopt the euro for 
their international, or at least their European, operations.  
For European investors, the single currency provides another huge advantage as 
eleven separate national stock markets suddenly switch to trading and valuing in euros 
rather than in their respective national currencies. This means reduced (or eliminated) 
currency risk for cross-border investment transactions, which in turn reduces 
transaction costs and further expands possibilities for trade and wealth creation. Again, 
non-euroland investors can reap the same benefits to the extent that they are willing to 
hold euros and transact business in that currency. 
Other significant economic benefits of the single currency include lowered 
information costs as European consumers find themselves able to compare directly 
prices for goods across borders. The business advantages of euro implementation 
include the ability of manufacturers to identify readily the most competitive suppliers of 
needed inputs. And the key feature of euro usage is the creation of an integrated 
European market with 290 million customers. This market will be larger than the 
United States, with its 270 million consumers. 
Central European countries such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 
appear to be jumping on the euro bandwagon with unexpected zeal. Since twothirds of 
their international trade takes place with euroland, billing theirEUcustomers in euros 
will mean substantial savings from currency hedging. Moreover, euro pricing makes the 
cost advantages of Central European companies more obvious to EU customers. The 541 
political  advantages to euro usage are also significant for these economies as they 
contemplate their own entry into the EU some years ahead. Even Finland, now 
anEUmember, finds the political effect of the euro compelling as that nation strives to 
complete its independence from Russia and its Soviet past 
 
Trade-Destroying Effects 
Several factors, however, may have trade-destroying effects as a result of the 
implementation of the single European currency. Some of these concerns may recede 
after the three-year transition period during which national currencies continue to 
circulate in parallel with the euro. Such transitional costs include the need for sellers to 
post dual prices for the three-year period; the need to carry larger cash balances (in both 
euros and national currency); and the one-time costs of converting some 3.2 million 
vending machines to the euro. In addition, trade diversion effects may be anticipated as 
the euro takes hold in Europe. Euro-zone consumers, benefiting from lower goods 
prices, may purchase fewer goods from outside the currency area. The impact may be 
especially felt in the financial services sector. For example, the introduction of the euro 
may spell the end (or decline) of the LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate), as 
euroland banks attempt to replace it with the EURIBOR, what these banks are touting 
as “a measure for Europe.” Such an action may reduce the importance of London as an 
international financial centre. American commercial banks such as Citicorp and Chase 
Manhattan and US investment bankers such as Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, 
Salomon Smith Barney, and Morgan Stanley, have already begun beefing up their 
Continental European presence with the launch of the euro. These banks are 
anticipating a doubling or a tripling of the size of European equity markets over the 
next decade. 
This bulking-up of American banks in Europe suggests stronger competition for 
both continental and London banks. This increased competition also arrives just as 
European banks contemplate the loss of up to 70% of their foreign exchange transaction 
fees due to the emergence of the euro. 
 
Uncertainties of Euro Implementation 
Aside from trade issues, however, several operational issues affecting national 
economies and domestic welfare remain to be resolved. Take the matter of the new 
European Central Bank. How wide is its mandate? Its declared function is to promote 
price stability. Will it also perform as lender of last resort when the need arises? How 
will cross-border bank supervision be carried out and which institution will do it? There 
is also the less compelling question of who will speak for the euro at meetings of the G7 
nations? 
But more important is, how will euroland authorities deal with financial crises and 
business cycle downturns? How will individual countries handle countryspecific 
cyclical downturns when they can no longer resort to monetary expansions or currency 
devaluation as policy weapons? For instance, what can a single Euroland member 
country do if it finds itself slipping into recession at the same time that the other ten 
euroland countries are enjoying an expansionary phase of the business cycle? The 
country in recession cannot rely on monetary policy or defensive devaluation to solve 
its problem as these sovereign powers have been surrendered in the cause of Economic 
and Monetary Union.8 The situation can be especially acute over the next three years, 
when countries are expected to support their currencies vis-a-vis the euro. Any sign of 542 
weakness will lead to a speculative attack on that currency, perhaps even an exit from 
the EMU. 
Even expansionary fiscal policy is largely precluded as a remedy since EMU 
member countries have signed onto the Stability and Growth Pact in 1996. This pact 
imposes severe fines onEMUcountries, which have budget deficits in excess of3% of 
their GDP. Even without the constraint imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact, 
attempts to reverse a cyclical downturn by an increase in deficit spending would result 
in a sharp rise in interest rates as the government borrows to finance the increase in 
spending. The absence of discretionary monetary policy for the country suffering the 
downturn means that the government budget constraint imposes substantial restrictions 
on fiscal policy “solutions.” Of course some national policies such as subsidies and 
public procurement that favour domestic firmsmay continue. But European Union 
officials are trying to curtail such actions. Besides, there is very little labour mobility 
within Europe to serve as an economic escape valve. Due to continued linguistic and 
cultural differences most European workers prefer to remain in their own countries. 
The United Kingdom and other nations outside of the euro zone retain the 
independence of a national monetary policy and of control over their exchange rate. If 
Britain were to experience a recession, the government has the full panoply of policy 
tools at its disposal to offset the cyclical downturn. This presumed policy independence 
is a large part of the explanation for Britain’s current desire to remain outside 
theEMUbloc. But is there a downside to this independence from the Euro? The answer 
is that a non-euro country can retain its policy independence, but if it chooses monetary 
policy options substantially at variance with EMU growth rates, the exchange rate will 
be forced to move to accommodate the difference. For example, suppose Britain finds 
itself in a recession while the euroland is in the boom phase of the cycle. The Bank of 
England has the ability to accelerate the rate of growth of the domestic money supply in 
order to attempt to pull the economy out of the doldrums. However, assuming the 
resultant growth rate of the money supply in Britain is faster than that chosen for the 
euro by the ECB, sterling will fall relative to the euro. The freedom to select a national 
monetary policy implies a trade-off in setting an exchange rate. This outcome may be 
desired, but it needs to be acknowledged nevertheless. 
Also implied by the above analysis is the fact that “policy independence” may be 
illusory to the extent that UK authorities want to maintain a more-or-less fixed 
exchange rate vis-a-vis the euro. Britain will have to adjust the growth rate of sterling to 
match the growth rate of the euro. Otherwise the sterling-euro exchange rate will start 
to move. Given the larger size of the euro currency zone, the pound will likely be the 
tail of the dog. The Danes and the Swedes are likely to find this effect even more 
substantial given their smaller relative sizes and greater dependence on euroland trade 
than Britain. 
Possible economic isolation may also play a role. Should the United Kingdom stay 
out of the EMU, its attractiveness as an investment destination may be harmed. 
Britain’s success in gaining foreign direct investment has been due, in part to its 
flexible, productive and reasonably-priced labour force and the available packages of 
regional aid. Pacific Rim and US firms have sought a UK base from which to tackle the 
lucrative European markets. Should the United Kingdom not join the EMU, such 
firmsmay choose to avoid Britain in favour of a continental Euro member. The recent 
decision by Toyota to favour France over the United Kingdom for a new investment 
project is a case in point. This outcome suggests the likelihood of an enlarged euro zone 543 
in the future, as non-euro EU members eventually seek to join the club. The price of 
national monetary sovereignty may be too high, especially if initial implementation of 
the euro goes smoothly over the next three years. 
 
Will the EMU have an inflationary Bias? 
Perhaps the most important concern of macro policy observers is the possibility 
that relatively left-leaning governments within euroland will push the ECB into the 
acceleration of monetary growth in order to lower the double-digit unemployment  rate 
of the euro eleven. There are already signs that pressures are building on the ECBto 
lower interest rates and “target” the exchange rate so as to reduce euroland’s 11.1% 
unemployment rate. As stated earlier, the ECB was established with a stated primary 
objective of maintaining price stability, but the governments behind the ECB may have 
a very different set of priorities. This sets up the interesting possibility that euro growth 
exceeds the growth of sterling, leading to a weakening of the euro vs. the pound. This 
may foce Britain into an unwanted acceleration of its own monetary growth rate to 
prevent further strengthening of the pound and negative effects on British exports to 
euroland. But inflating the pound to keep up with the euro raises the spectre of 
disequilibrium against the dollar and/or the yen.  
Only time will tell if such fears are justified. The introduction of the euro provides 
opportunities for increased economic growth and welfare. But it raises challenges as 
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